In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TUgames using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which t w o players are symmetric then their payo s change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, e ciency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games, such a s the class of simple games or the class of apex games.
Introduction
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payo s by cooperation can be described by a c o operative game with transferable utility or simply a TU-game being a pair N;v, where N = f1; : : : ; n gis the set of players and v: 2 N !I R i s a characteristic function such that v; = 0. Since we take the set of players N to be xed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function v. The collection of all characteristic functions on N is denoted by G N . A single valued solution for TU-games is a function f: G N ! IR N which assigns an jNj-dimensional real vector to every TU-game. This vector can be seen as a distribution of the payo s that can be obtained by cooperation over the individual players in the game. A famous solution is the Shapley value Shapley 1953a. Various axiomatizations of the Shapley value have been given. In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using e ciency, the null player property and a fairness property. This last property states that if to a game v 2 G N w e add a game w 2 G N in which players i and j are symmetric then the payo s of players i and j change by the same amount, i.e., if wS f i g = w S f j g for all S N n f i; jg then f i v + w , f i v = f j v + w , f j v .
This concept of fairness is related to fairness as introduced by M y erson 1977 for games in which the possibilities of coalition formation in a TU-game are limited because of the fact that players are part of a limited communication structure. In that 1 model fairness means that deleting a communication relation between two players has the same e ect on both their payo s. A similar fairness axiom is used in van den Brink 1997 for games in which the cooperation possibilities in a TU-game are limited because the players are part of a hierarchical permission structure in which there are players who need permission from certain other players before they are allowed to cooperate. In that model fairness means that deleting a permission relation between two players has the same e ect on both their payo s. In van den Brink 1995a a fairness axiom for relational power measures for directed g r aphs 1 is introduced. In that context fairness means that deleting a relation between two nodes in a digraph changes their relational power by the same amount.
As already noted by Dubey 1975, axiomatizations It turns out that e ciency, the null player property, and fairness also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. Van den Brink 1995a shows that these three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the even smaller class of apex games.
Besides the literature on fairness started in Myerson 1977 , this paper also is related to the axiomatization of the Shapley value by e ciency, symmetry and strong monotonicity given in Young 1985 . A solution satis es strong monotonicity if for every pair of games v;w 2 G N and i 2 N, the payo of i in v is at least equal to its payo in w if the marginal contribution of player i to any coalition in v is at least equal to its corresponding marginal contribution in w, i.e., f i v f i w i f v S f i g , v S w S f i g , w S for all S N n f i g . As argued by C h un 1991, it is su cient to require that f i v = f i w i f v S f i g ,v S = w S f i g ,w S for all S N n f i g . So, strong monotonicity essentially compares the payo of a player if we add a game in which this player is a null player, while fairness compares the change in payo of two players if we add a game in which these players are symmetric. 1 A directed graph is a pair N;D where N is a nite set of nodes and D N N is a binary relation on N . A relational power measure for directed graphs is a function that assigns real values to all nodes in a directed graph. For a general discussion about relational power measures for directed graphs we refer to van den Brink 1994.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de ne fairness and show that the Shapley value is the unique solution on G N that satis es e ciency, the null player property and fairness. We also show that these three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. We end Section 2 by comparing fairness with strong monotonicity and balanced c ontributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson 1980 and Hart and Mass-Colell 1989. In Section 3 we generalize the characterization of the Shapley value to weighted Shapley values as considered in, e.g., Shapley 1953b and Kalai and Samet 1987 . Finally, there is an appendix that discusses components in TU-games which are used in the proof of the main theorem. It is easy to verify that every solution that satis es symmetry and additivity also satis es fairness. A solution f: G N ! IR N satis es symmetry if i; j 2 N being symmetric players in v 2 G N implies that f i v = f j v . Solution f: G N ! IR N satis es additivity if for every pair of games v;w 2 G N it holds that fv + w = f v + f w , where v + w 2 G N is de ned by v + w S = v S + w S for all S N.
Proposition 2.4 If f: G N ! IR N satis es symmetry and additivity, then f also satises fairness. Proof Let f: G N ! IR N satisfy symmetry and additivity. F urther, suppose that i; j 2 N are symmetric i n w 2 G N . F or every v 2 G N it then holds that
where the rst and sixth equality follow from additivity, and the third equality follows from symmetry of f. T h us, f satis es fairness.
2 It is known that the Shapley value is characterized by e ciency, the null player property, symmetry and additivity. By Proposition 2.4 it thus also satis es fairness. A solution that satis es fairness need not satisfy symmetry nor additivity. This can be seen from For transparancy we split the proof that there can be at most one solution satisfying e ciency, the null player property, and fairness in two parts 2 . F or every v 2 G N w e de ne Dv = f T N j v T 6 = 0 g , and dv = j D v j :
1 So, every v 2 G N can be expressed as v = P T2Dv v T u T , where u T is the unanimity game of coalition T N, i.e., u T S = 1 i f S T , and u T S = 0 otherwise. We rst consider games for which there are at most two coalitions with a non-zero dividend.
Lemma 2.6 Let G N 2 := fv 2 G N j d v 2 g . There c an be at most one solution f: G N 2 ! IR N that satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness.
Proof Suppose that f: G N 2 ! IR N satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness. Let v 2 G N 2 . If dv = 0 then v is the null game, i.e., vS = 0 for all S N. The null player property then implies that f i v = 0 for all i 2 N.
If dv = 1 then v is a multiple of the unanimity game of some coalition T N, i.e., v = c T u T for some T N and c T 2 IR; c T 6 = 0. The null player property implies that f i c T u T = 0 for all i 2 N n T. 
With e ciency it follows that P The null player property implies that f i v = 0 for all i 2 N n T H. Take a j 2 N n T H . Note that, by assumption, there is at least one null player.
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For every i 2 T, fairness and the fact that f j v = f j c T u T = 0, imply that f i v , f i c T u T = f j v , f j c T u T = 0 . Since dc T u T = 1, we already de-
Similarly, it follows that f i v = c H j H j for all i 2 H. So, fv is also uniquely determined in this case.
3. Suppose that T H = ; and T H = N. Note that dv = 2 implies that jNj 2. We distinguish the following two cases with respect to jNj:
A. We rst consider the case that jNj 3. Suppose without loss of generality that jTj 2. Take a j 2 T and h 2 H. Thus, two players i; j 2 N are connected in game v if there exists a sequence of`active' coalitions from player i to player j such that every coalition in this sequence has a nonempty i n tersection with its neighbouring coalitions. A coalition B N is a maximal connected coalition in v 2 G N if and only if the following two conditions are satis ed: i for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are connected in v; ii for every i 2 B and j 2 N n B it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
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For a discussion of connected coalitions we refer to the appendix of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2.5
It is well-known that the Shapley value satis es e ciency and the null player property.
Since the Shapley value satis es symmetry and additivity, it follows from Propositon 2.4 that it also satis es fairness.
Now, suppose that f: G N ! IR N satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness. Let v 2 G N .
W e show that fv is uniquely determined by induction on the number dv de ned in equation 1. By Lemma 2.6, fv is uniquely determined for all games v with dv 2.
Proceeding by induction, assume that fv 0 is uniquely determined for all v 0 2 G N with dv 0 k k 2, and let dv = k + 1 . W e distinguish the following three cases with respect to jBvj, where Bv denotes the partition of N into maximal connected coalitions in v:
1. Suppose that jBvj = 1 meaning that N is a connected coalition in v. Note that dv 3 implies that jNj 2. Take a j 2 N . W e show that f j v is uniquely determined in the following three steps. a
We de ne the sets T k ; k 2 f 0 g I N , as follows: : 10 If i 2 T k then we can say that i is connected to j through k , 1 other players. b For every k 2 IN with N n S k,1 l=0 T l 6 = ;, w e show that T k 6 = ;. On the contrary, suppose that T k = ;. Let i 2 N n S k,1 l=0 T l . Since by assumption T k = ;, it holds by de nition of the sets T k that there exists no T N such that T S k,1 l=0 T l 6 = ;, T 3 i, and v T 6 = 0 .
Thus, for every T N such that T S k,1 l=0 T l 6 = ; and T 3 i it holds that v T = 0. But then i and j are not connected in v. This is in contradiction with jBvj = 1 . T h us, T k 6 = ;. From this it follows that there exists an m 2 IN such that a T k 6 = ; for all k 2 f 0 ; : : : ; m g , b T k T l = ; for all k;l2 f 0 ; : : : ; m g ; k 6 = l , and c S m k=0 T k = N. Thus T 0 ; : : : ; T m is a partition of N consisting of non-empty sets only.
c Suppose that f j v = c for some value c 2 IR. Next we determine for every i 2 N n f j g the value f i v as a function of c by the following procedure:
Step 1 Let k = 1 and c j = 0 and thus f j v = c + c j . Goto Step 2.
Step 2 By de nition of the set T k , for every i 2 T k there exists an h 2 S k,1 l=0 T l and a T N such that T f i; hg and v T 6 = 0 . 2. If jBvj 3, then take a j 2 N and suppose that f j v = c . F or every i 2 N n f j g there is a T 2 Dv with T f i; jg = ;. F airness then implies that f i v = c , f j v , v T u T + f i v , v T u T . By the induction hypothesis we determined all f i v , v T u T ; i 2 N . E ciency then uniquely determines c , and thus all f i v; i 2 N . 3. Finally, suppose that jBvj = 2, i.e., Bv = f B 1 ; B 2 g . Suppose without loss of generality that jB 2 j 2. Take a j 2 B 1 , and suppose that f j v = c . F airness then implies that for every i 2 B 1 there is some T 2 2 Dv, T 2 B 2 , with f i v = c , f j v , v T 2 u T 2 + f i v , v T 2 u T 2 . Take a T B 2 , T 2 D v and h 2 B 2 n T. Such a n h exists by assumption.
Fairness implies that f h v = c , f j v , v T u T + f h v , v T u T . Finally, for every i 2 B 2 n f h g there is a T 1 2 Dv with T 1 B 1 , and thus fairness implies that f i v = f h v , f h v , v T 1 u T 1 + f j v , v T 1 u T 1 for i 2 B 2 n f h g . E ciency and the induction hypothesis again uniquely determine c , and thus all values f i v; i 2 N .
Thus, there can be at most one solution f: G N ! IR N that satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness. Since the Shapley value satis es these axioms, f must be equal to the Shapley value.
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The independence of the three axioms of Theorem 2.5 can be illustrated by the following three well-known solutions:
1. The Banzhaf value : G N ! IR N given by i v = 1 2 j N j,1 X S3i vS , vS n f i g for all i 2 N; satis es the null player property and fairness. It does not satisfy e ciency. The Banzhaf value is introduced in Banzhaf 1965 for simple games. Characterizations of the Banzhaf value for TU-games can be found in, e.g., Lehrer 1988 and Haller 1994 . Next we determine fb T b y the following procedure:
Step 1 Let H 0 = N n T, k = 0 , v 0 = u T , and c 0 = 1 jTj and thus f i v 0 = c 0 for all i 2 T and f i v 0 = 0 for all i 2 H 0 . Goto Step 2.
Step 2 If H k = ; then Stop. Else take a j 2 H k and de ne v k+1 = v k , P S N S T fjg b S .
The null player property implies that f i v = 0 for all i 2 H k n f j g .
Since all f i u T are equal for i 2 T, fairness implies that there exists a c k+1 2 IR such that f i v k+1 = c k +1 for all i 2 T. Applying fairness to v k and v k+1 yields for every i 2 T that f j v k+1 = f i v k +1 ,
Applying fairness to u T and v k+1 then also yields that f i v k+1 = f j v k +1 for all i 2 N n T H k .
So,
Since c k+1 is the only unkown, e ciency uniquely determines c k+1 , and thus fv k+1 . Goto Step 3.
Step 3 Let k = k + 1 and H k = H k,1 n f j g . Goto Step 2.
By this procedure we h a v e determined fb T . If d s v = 2 then v = b T + b H for some T;H N; T 6 = H, and fv is determined i n a w a y similar as the case dv = 2 i n t h e p r o o f o f Lemma 2.6, but with the role of unanimity games replaced by standard games. Besides replacing unanimity games by standard games, we also should avoid the null player property since this property cannot be used in this case. We do this as follows. In the case T H 6 = ;, assume without loss of generality that T nH 6 = ;. T ake a n h 2 T n H . F or every i 2 N nT H, fairness implies that f i v,f i b T = f h v , f h b T . Since f i b T and f h b T are known, and f h v is expressed as c plus a known constant, we also have expressed f i v a s c plus a known constant. E ciency, again determines c , and thus fv is determined.
In a similar way the null player property can be avoided in case T H = ;; T H 6 = N . In the third and last case, T H = ;; T H = N , the null player property is not used.
Proceeding by induction we assume that fv 0 = S h v 0 for all v 0 2 G N S with d s v 0 k k 2, and let d s v = k +1. Again, it can be shown that fv is uniquely determined by replacing unanimity games in the proof of Theorem 2.5 by standard games, and replacing connected coalitions in v by standard connected coalitions in v. Here, we de ne two players i; j 2 N to be standard connected in v if there exists a sequence of coalitions T 1 ; : : : ; T m such that i i 2 T 1 ; j 2 T m ; ii T k T k+1 6 = ; for all k 2 f 1 ; : : : ; m ,1 g ; iii vT k 6 = 0 for all k 2 f 1 ; : : : ; m g . Then we denote by B s v the partition of N into maximal standard connected coalitions, where B N is a maximal standard connected coalition in v if and only if the following two conditions are satis ed: i for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are standard connected in v; ii for every i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not standard connected in v.
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For the smaller class of apex games, v an den Brink 1995a shows that e ciency, the null player property and fairness characterize the Shapley value on this class of games. The apex game a j;J , j 2 N, J N n f j g , assigns the value one to every coalition that either contains J or contains the apex player j and at least one player from J. All other coalitions are assigned the value zero. This fairness property for apex games states that making a non-apex player a null player changes the payo s of this non-apex player and the apex player by the same amount i f j J j 2, i.e., f i a j;J , f i a j;Jnfig = f j a j;J , f j a j;Jnfig for all i 2 J, jJj 2.
Although the purpose of this paper is to characterize the Shapley value on classes of games with xed player set N, w e conclude this section by comparing fairness with the concept of balanced contributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson 1980 and Hart and Mas-Colell 1989 . This property is stated for games with variable sets of players. In order to state this property, w e therefore denote in this paragraph a TU-game as a pair N;v, and by G we denote the collection of all TU-games. Fo r a c haracteristic function v on N and coalition T N we denote by v T the restricted characteristic function on T given by v T S = v S for all S T. A solution on G is a function f that assigns to every game N;v2 G an jNj-dimensional real vector representing a payo distribution over the players in N. Thus, to games with player sets of di erent size such a solution assigns vectors of di erent dimension. A solution on G has balanced c ontributions if for every N;v 2 G and i; j 2 N it holds that 4 f i N;v,f i N n f j g ; v N nfjg = f j N;v,f j N n f i g ; v N nfig .
It is easy to verify that the egalitarian rule satis es fairness 5 but does not have balanced contributions. Under the assumptions that a solution f on G satis es single player e ciency 6 and permutation neutrality 7 it holds that f satis es fairness if it has balanced contributions. Proposition 2.9 If f is a solution for TU-games that satis es single player e ciency, permutation neutrality and has balanced c ontributions, then f satis es fairness. 4 For convenience we write fN;v instead of fN;v. 5 Here fairness is de ned on the class G in a straightforward manner. Thus, the sum of the payo s that are assigned to the players in N is equal to the worth vN irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players. Similarly, a null player always gets a zero payo , irrespective of the weights. We generalize fairness in the following way. Axiom 3.3 -fairness Let 2 IR N ++ , and let i; j 2 N be symmetric in w 2 G N . F or every v 2 G N it holds that j f i v + w , f i v = i f j v + w , f j v.
Note that for 2 IR N ++ with i = 1 for all i 2 N, these axioms boil down to the corresponding axioms stated in Section 2.
Theorem 3.4 A function f: G N IR N ++ ! IR N is equal to the weighted Shapley value Sh w if and only if it satis es -e ciency, the -null player property, and -fairness.
The proof is obtained by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 in a straightforward way in particular, the use of fairness, and is therefore omitted.
Another type of weighted Shapley value has been considered in Kalai and Samet 1987. A weight system is a pair ! = ; , where 2 IR N ++ is a vector of weights and = S 1 ; : : : ; S m i s a n ordered partition of N. Let S N denote the collection of all ordered partitions of N. For every = S 1 ; : : : ; S m 2 S N and S N we denote k S = maxfk 2 f 1 ; : : : ; m g j S S k 6 = ;g, and K S = S S k S . The KS-weighted Shapley value is the function Sh ks :G N IR N ++ S N ! I R N given by Thus, the sum of the payo s that are assigned to the players in N again is equal to the worth vN irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players and the way the players are ordered in the partition . Similarly, n ull players earn nothing irrespective of the weights and the ordering of the players in the partition . Axiom 3.7 ;-fairness Let 2 IR N ++ , = S 1 ; : : : ; S m 2 S N , and let i 2 S k and j 2 S l , k;l 2 f 1 ; : : : ; m g , b e symmetric in w 2 G N . F or every v 2 G N it holds that i j f i v + w , f i v = i f j v + w , f j v if k = l; ii f i v + w , f i v = 0 if k l .
Again, by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 it can be shown that the KS-weighted Shapley value is the unique function f: G N IR N ++ S N ! I R N that satis es ;e ciency, the ; -null player property, and ; -fairness.
Appendix: connected coalitions and components in TU-games
Maximal connected coalitions as used in the proof of Theorem 2.5 coincide with minimal components in TU-games. Components in TU-games are already considered in, e.g., Aumann and Dr eze 1974 and Chang and Kan 1994. A coalition B N is a component in game v 2 G N if it acts`independently' of the players in N n B, in the sense that the worth of any coalition S N is equal to the worth that can be obtained by those players in S who also belong to B plus the worth that can be obtained by the coalition of other players in S. A component is called a minimal component in a game if all its strict subsets are not components in that game. 
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It is easy to show that the empty set and the`grand coalition' N are components in every v 2 G N . Moreover, for every pair of components in v it holds that their union and their intersection both are components in v. This is shown in van den Brink 1995b. For completeness we give the proof below. 
